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Abstract: A suitable unified statistical formulation of quantum
and classical mechanics in a ∗-algebraic setting leads us to con-
clude that information itself is noncommutative in quantum me-
chanics. Specifically we refer here to an observer’s information
regarding a physical system. This is seen as the main differ-
ence from classical mechanics, where an observer’s information
regarding a physical system obeys classical probability theory.
Quantum mechanics is then viewed purely as a mathematical
framework for the probabilistic description of noncommutative
information, with the projection postulate being a noncommuta-
tive generalization of conditional probability. This view clarifies
many problems surrounding the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, particularly problems relating to the measuring process.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are several problems surrounding the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, mainly involving the measuring process: What does the collapse of
the wave function mean? What causes it? And so on. In this paper we
argue that many of these problems are essentially present in classical me-
chanics as well. If one accepts that the nature of information in quantum
mechanics differs from that in classical mechanics in the way to be explained
below, then quantum mechanics does not introduce conceptual problems not
already present in the measuring process in classical mechanics.
In classical mechanics a measurement is nothing strange. It is merely an
event where the observer obtains information about some physical system.
A measurement therefore changes the observer’s information regarding the
system. One can then ask: What does the change in the observer’s infor-
mation mean? What causes it? And so on. These questions correspond to
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the questions above, but now they seem tautological rather than mysterious,
since our intuitive idea of information tells us that the change in the ob-
server’s information simply means that he has received new data, and that
the change is caused by the reception of the new data. We will see that
the quantum case is no different, except that the nature of information in
quantum mechanics differs from that in classical mechanics. We now first
describe the basic idea.
Let’s say an observer has information regarding the pure state (the point
in phase space) of a classical system, but not necessarily complete informa-
tion (this is the typical case, since precise measurements are not possible
in practice). Now the observer performs a measurement on the system to
receive new data (for example he might have information regarding a par-
ticle’s position, now he measures the particle’s momentum). The observer’s
information after this measurement then differs from his information before
the measurement. In other words, a measurement “disturbs” the observer’s
information.
In classical mechanics we know that an observer’s information isn’t merely
changed, but is actually increased by a measurement (assuming the measure-
ment provides data not already accounted for in the observer’s information).
We will view this as an assumption regarding the nature of information which
does not hold in quantum mechanics. On an operational level, this can be
seen as the essential difference between quantum mechanics and classical
mechanics: In both quantum and classical mechanics the observer’s informa-
tion is changed by a measurement if the measurement provides new data, but
in classical mechanics the observer’s information before the measurement is
compatible with his information after the measurement, while in quantum
mechanics this is not necessarily the case. (Also see Heisenberg,(1) p. 20.)
More precisely, we view the observer’s information about a physical sys-
tem as a set of probabilities which he assigns to the outcomes of all measure-
ments which he can perform on the system. When the observer performs a
measurement to receive new data concerning the system, these probabilities
generally change. In the classical case the probabilities change according
to conditional probability, also known as the Bayes rule. Roughly this can
be seen as the minimum change necessary to bring the observer’s set of
probabilities up to date with the result of the measurement. By the word
“compatible” above, we mean that any probability which is zero just before
the measurement (say the probability for some particle to be in a certain re-
gion in space), will still be zero just after the measurement. In this sense the
observer’s information can only increase due to a measurement of a classical
system. In quantum mechanics however, we have the projection postulate
instead of the classical conditional probability. The projection postulate can
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change a zero probability, and when this happens we can say that the ob-
server’s information before the measurement has been invalidated. (If the
observer expresses his set of probabilities in terms of a probability density
function, and a density of zero at some point changes due to a measurement,
then we can likewise say that his information has been invalidated, since the
classical conditional probability would not cause such a change.) The basic
idea of this paper is to view the projection postulate as a “quantum Bayes
rule,” as has also been done by Bub,(2) Fuchs,(3) and others.(4)
In Section 2 we show how this point of view is actually an outgrowth of the
mathematics of quantum and classical mechanics formulated statistically in a
suitable (and general) way in terms of ∗-algebras. Mathematically speaking,
an observer’s information in quantum mechanics is noncommutative, while
in classical mechanics it is commutative. Section 3 shows how the idea of
noncommutative information can clarify conceptual problems surrounding
the measuring process in quantum mechanics.
2. PROBABILISTIC DESCRIPTION OF IN-
FORMATION
In this section we present a unified statistical setting for quantum and classi-
cal mechanics using the language of ∗-algebras. We consider a physical sys-
tem (quantum or classical), and an observer who can perform measurements
on the system. Our goal is essentially to describe the observer’s information
regarding the system. In this vein we say that:
A measurement on a system by an observer, is by definition the
reception of data by the observer which can change his informa-
tion about the system.
Of course, we have to assume that a measurement is accurate (i.e. the
data is correct), even though the measurement may not be precise (i.e. the
data is not maximal), for example when the position of a classical particle is
measured, a set of possible values is obtained rather than a single value, but
the value of the position at the time of the measurement is contained in this
set.
We will view all measurements as yes/no experiments. For example, if a
particle’s position is measured, and the only data the observer receives is that
the position is in the interval [a, b], then we view this as a “yes” obtained for
the yes/no experiment “Is the particle’s position in [a, b]?” Furthermore, we
assume that a measurement is ideal in the sense that a repetition of a yes/no
3
experiment would give the same result (assuming that no time-evolution or
other measurements takes place between the two yes/no experiments). This
is related to the accuracy of a measurement mentioned above, since if we say
that the information obtained in a measurement is correct, it means that if
we could repeat the measurement (yes/no experiment) then we would with
probability one get the same result. (We can therefore also view a measure-
ment as a preparation.) Note that in practice it is not necessarily possible
to repeat a yes/no experiment, since the second measurement of position,
say, might only give an interval overlapping with the interval obtained in the
first measurement, rather than giving exactly the same interval (this would
depend on the experimental setup however). Below we will be able to give a
better formal definition of an ideal measurement. Meanwhile we note that a
series of ideal measurements of the same observable, with each measurement
giving a set of values similar to the position measurement above, should at
least be consistent with each other (assuming there’s no time-evolution, mea-
surements of other observables, or outside influences on the system), in the
sense that the intersection of the sets obtained in the measurements should
be non-empty.
2.1. General structure
Here we treat the general mathematical structure of a statistical setting for
mechanics (classical and quantum). We have to give a mathematical descrip-
tion of four things:
(a) The observables of the system (i.e. that which can be measured by
the observer).
(b) The state of the system (i.e. the observer’s information regarding the
system). We can say that by definition the state of the system is a math-
ematical object which for each possible outcome of each measurement that
can be performed on the system, provides the observer with the probability
for obtaining that outcome when performing that measurement (these prob-
abilities constitute the observer’s information). In the rest of this paper, this
is what the term “state” (of the system) will mean. The state of the system
must be constructed from measurements previously performed on the system
by the observer.
(c) The measuring process. A measurement generally changes an ob-
server’s information about the system on which he performed the measure-
ment, in other words it generally changes the state of the system.
(d) The time-evolution of the system (dynamics).This describes how the
probabilities mentioned in (b) change as we move forward (or backward) in
time.
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We give the following set of postulates as a mathematical description of
(a)-(d):
(i) The observables of the system are described by a unital ∗-algebra A,
called the observable algebra of the system, in the sense that for every yes/no
experiment that can be performed on the system at a given point in time,
A contains a corresponding projection P , called the projection of the yes/no
experiment (at that point in time).
Remark: A ∗-algebra is a complex vector space with a multiplication law
(that need not be commutative) and an adjoint operation A 7→ A∗. A ∗-
algebra is called unital if it contains a unit element 1, meaning 1A = A1 = A
for all A in the algebra. A projection is an element P having the properties
P 2 = P = P ∗. See for example Refs. 5 and 6 for more on ∗-algebras.
(ii) The state of the system is described by a state ω on A such that for
every yes/no experiment, ω(P ) is the probability of getting “yes,” where P is
the projection of the yes/no experiment at the time at which it is performed.
Remark: A state on A is a linear functional ω:A → C which is positive
[ω(A∗A) ≥ 0] and normalized [ω(1) = 1].
(iii) Suppose the observer obtains a “yes” for a yes/no experiment per-
formed on the system. After the experiment the state of the system is then
given by the state ω′ on A defined by
ω′(A) = ω(PAP )/ω(P ) (1)
for all A in A, where P is the projection of the yes/no experiment at the
point in time at which the experiment was performed. We can view this as
the formal definition of an ideal measurement.
Remarks: As will be explained in Subsections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, Eq. (1) is
a noncommutative generalization of conditional probability. So, the proba-
bilities which constitute the observer’s information, change according to this
(in general noncommutative) conditional probability, when the observer per-
forms a measurement on the system. This change, which happens in both
classical and quantum mechanics, does not refer to any influence the measur-
ing instruments might have on the system being measured. Such influences
are not described by the (noncommutative) conditional probability (1), but
rather by a suitable time-evolution resulting from the interaction between
system and measuring instrument, if the interaction is not negligible.
Furthermore, in the case of commuting projections P1 and P2, we have
(P2−P1P2P1)
∗(P2−P1P2P1) = P2−P1P2P1 (in fact, P2−P1P2P1 is a projec-
tion), hence ω(P2−P1P2P1) ≥ 0, which means that 0 ≤ ω(P1P2P1) ≤ ω(P2),
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since P1P2P1 = (P2P1)
∗(P2P1). This ensures the compatibility mentioned in
the Introduction, namely that ω(P2) = 0 implies ω
′(P2) = 0, where ω
′ is the
state given by Eq. (1) with P = P1 after a “yes” in a yes/no experiment with
projection P1. This always happens in the classical case, since the observable
algebra is commutative. A well-known counter example in the quantum case
is a sequence of measurements of the polarization of light.
(iv) The time-evolution of the system is given by a one-parameter ∗-
automorphism group τ of A, such that if at time 0 the projection of a given
yes/no experiment is P , then at time t the projection of the same yes/no
experiment will be τ t(P ). (The choice of when time 0 is, is arbitrary, since
τ is a group.) So we’re using the “Heisenberg picture,” namely the time-
evolution does not act on the state of the system.
Remark: Mathematically this means that τ t is a ∗-automorphism [a linear
bijection A → A such that τ t(AB) = τ t(A)τ t(B) and τ t(A
∗) = τ t(A)
∗] for
each t ∈ R, with τ 0 the identity mapping on A, and τ t+s = τ tτ s.
These postulates can be viewed as the general structure of mechanics
in a statistical setting. We now briefly discuss how quantum and classical
mechanics fit into this picture.
2.2. Classical mechanics
Assume that the system is classical, and that its phase space is F , which
we view purely as a measurable space (in the sense of measure theory; see
Ref. 7 for an exposition of the measure theoretic ideas we will use here).
The pure state of the system is by definition the system’s point in the phase
space F . The state of the system (in the sense of Subsection 2.1) represents
the observer’s information regarding the pure state. (The pure state is the
state of maximal information.)
We then take the observable algebra as A = B∞(F ), which is the unital
∗-algebra of all bounded complex-valued measurable functions on F . The
multiplication law of A is just pointwise multiplication of functions, and the
adjoint operation is simply complex conjugation. Note that A is commutative
(or abelian), in other words fg = gf for all f, g ∈ A.
The projections of A are the characteristic functions, which we will denote
by χ. For any measurable set S ⊂ F , the characteristic function χS is the
real-valued function on F assuming the value 1 on S, and zero everywhere
else. A yes/no experiment can then be viewed as having the form “Is the
pure state of the system in S?” and the projection of this yes/no experiment
is χS. This happens as follows: Any observable f of the system can be
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represented as a measurable function f : F → R. (Note that this function
can be unbounded, and is therefore not necessarily contained in A.) If f is
measured when the pure state is x, then the precise result would be f(x).
A yes/no experiment concerning this observable in general has the form “Is
the value of f in V ?” where V is some Borel set in R. The projection of
this yes/no experiment is χf−1(V ), since f
−1(V ) is the set in phase space
corresponding to a value of f in V .
We can describe the observer’s information regarding the pure state of
the system by a probability measure µ on F such that µ(S) is the probability
that the pure state is contained in the measurable set S. This gives a state
ω on A defined by
ω(g) =
∫
gdµ.
This indeed describes the system’s state in the sense of postulate (ii), since
ω(χS) = µ(S).
For the yes/no experiment with projection χS, postulate (iii) is equivalent
to the probability measure changing in the case of a “yes” to µ′ defined by
µ′(U) = µ(U ∩ S)/µ(S) (2)
for any measurable set U in F . Here µ′ is the probability measure describing
the observer’s information after the yes/no experiment. This equivalence,
namely that µ′ is the (necessarily unique) probability measure giving the
state ω′(g) =
∫
gdµ′ on A satisfying Eq. (1), follows from standard measure
theoretic arguments involving Lebesgue convergence.
From Eq. (2) it is clear that in the classical case postulate (iii) is merely
a conditional probability. We therefore view postulate (iii) as a generaliza-
tion of a conditional probability to the case where the observable algebra
can be noncommutative (as is the case for quantum mechanics discussed in
Subsection 2.3).
The time-evolution of the system is given by a flow Tt : F → F which
for every t ∈ R maps measurable sets to measurable sets, and has the group
property Ts+t = TsTt with T0 the identity mapping on F (which implies
that Tt is bijective for every t). This indeed defines a one-parameter ∗-
automorphism group on A by the Koopman(8) construction
τ t(g) = g ◦ Tt
which then gives the time-evolution in the sense of postulate (iv).
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It should be clear that what we have described here is little more than
probability theory. Physics really only enter once we specify F and Tt. Even
so, this is how the general structure can be used as a statistical setting for
classical mechanics.
Remark: We can in principle consider the state ω and the projections of
the various yes/no experiments of the system as being fundamental concepts.
The point in phase space is then nothing more than a convenient theoretical
construct which can be viewed as the objective state of the system, since it is
not changed by the conditional probability during a measurement. When we
move to the more general noncommutative setting of quantum mechanics,
the idea of an objective state is not possible anymore. The noncommutative
conditional probability simply does not allow it. (We return to this in Sub-
section 2.3.) It therefore seems conceptually sensible not to view the point
in phase of a classical system as having fundamental physical significance.
This line of thought was also promoted by Born,(9) pp.164-170.
2.3. Quantum mechanics
Assume that the system is quantum mechanical, and that its state space is H,
which is a Hilbert space (for example an L2-space containing wave functions).
We then take the observable algebra as A = L(H), which is the unital ∗-
algebra of all bounded linear operators H→ H. Since the observables of the
system (represented as linear operators in H) can be unbounded, they are
not necessarily contained in A. Rather, A contains the spectral projections
of the observables. The multiplication law of A is usual multiplication of
operators, and the adjoint operation is the usual Hilbert adjoint. Note that
A is noncommutative, in other words there are A and B in A such that
AB 6= BA. (We are assuming that H is a non-trivial state space, that is to
say its dimension is greater than one.)
We can describe the observer’s information regarding the system by a
density operator (or density matrix) ρ on H. [By definition, ρ is an element
of L(H) with the properties ρ ≥ 0 and Tr(ρ) = 1, where Tr denotes the trace
of an operator.] This gives a state ω on A defined by
ω(A) = Tr(ρA)
which describes the system’s state in the sense of postulate (ii).
For the yes/no experiment with projection P , postulate (iii) is equivalent
to the well known projection postulate
ρ′ = PρP/Tr(ρP ) (3)
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of quantum mechanics, where ρ′ is the density operator describing the ob-
server’s information after a “yes” was obtained for the yes/no experiment.
The equivalence follows from the fact that if Tr(ρ1A) = Tr(ρ2A) for all
A ∈ L(H) for two density operators ρ1 and ρ2 on H, then setting A = ρ1−ρ2
gives ∥∥(ρ1 − ρ2)2∥∥1 = Tr((ρ1 − ρ2)2) = 0
where ‖·‖1 denotes the trace-class norm.
(6) Hence (ρ1−ρ2)
2 = 0 and therefore
‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
2 = ‖(ρ1 − ρ2)
2‖ = 0, where ‖·‖ denotes the usual operator norm.
So ρ1 = ρ2, proving the equivalence, namely that ρ
′ is the unique density
operator insuring that ω′(A) = Tr(ρ′A) satisfies Eq. (1).
Our comments concerning the classical case lead us to conclude that the
projection postulate of quantum mechanics is a generalization of conditional
probability to the case of a noncommutative observable algebra (also see
Bub(2)). So the projection postulate is indeed a quantum Bayes rule, as
mentioned in the Introduction. Also see Ref. 10 for a short survey of the
closely related idea of noncommutative conditional expectations.
Eq. (3) of course contains the projection postulate for a state vector
(and in particular the collapse of a wave function) as a special case. [One
can in fact also work the other way around, deriving postulate (iii) from the
projection postulate for a state vector in Hilbert space, through a heuristic
argument using the GNS construction.(11)] Since a measurement generally
changes a state vector by the projection postulate, we have to conclude in
the framework that we have set up so far, that a state vector is observer
dependent rather than being a property of the system (unlike the pure state
of a classical system, which can be viewed as having an objective reality).
In other words, even when the system’s state ω is given by a state vector
ψ ∈ H, namely ω(A) = 〈ψ,Aψ〉, the state is still nothing more than the
observer’s information, which changes via the noncommutative conditional
probability when a measurement is made. This point of view was also taken
by Fuchs and Peres.(12) Another way to see it is as follows: The same density
matrix can be obtained from two different sets of state vectors (the two sets
having no scalar multiples of state vectors in common), where the vectors
from such a set is weighed by probabilities to give the density matrix. Since
a density matrix represents the observer’s information, it therefore does not
make sense for the observer to say that the system has a state vector when
he does not know what the state vector is.
The time-evolution of the system is given in the sense of postulate (iv)
by the one-parameter ∗-automorphism group on A defined by
τ t(A) = e
iHt/~Ae−iHt/~
9
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system.
Remark: For an observable represented by a (possibly unbounded) self-
adjoint linear operator A in H, the projection of the yes/no experiment “Is
the value of A in V ?” can be taken as the spectral projection χV (A) in
terms of the Borel functional calculus on self-adjoint operators; see Ref.
13, pp. 197-200 and 230, for the construction and properties of this cal-
culus. Loosely speaking, this projection represents the part of A whose spec-
trum is contained in the Borel subset V of R. It is interesting to note that
this is very similar to the classical case in Subsection 2.2, where we used
χf−1(V ) = χV ◦ f instead of χV (A). We can write χV (f) := χV ◦ f to com-
plete the analogy, where more generally g(f) := g ◦ f defines a Borel func-
tional calculus on the measurable functions f : F → R for Borel measurable
g : R → C. Furthermore, for two disjoint Borel sets U and V in R, we have
χU(A)χV (A) = χU∩V (A) = 0, so by Eq. (1) two consecutive measurements
of the observable A (quantum or classical) cannot give contradicting results
(namely that A’s value is in both U and V ), as was mentioned just before
Subsection 2.1.
The ∗-algebraic (or C*-algebraic) approach to quantum physics is de-
scribed at length in Haag.(14)
2.4. Information
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, in the classical case the general structure
that we’ve described is actually just probability theory. One can shift the
perspective somewhat by saying that in the classical case this general struc-
ture is a probabilistic description of information. We also saw that quantum
mechanics has exactly the same the general structure, except that it is non-
commutative. In particular, the projection postulate of quantum mechan-
ics is a noncommutative conditional probability. The mathematics there-
fore seem to tell us that the general structure of quantum mechanics is a
mathematical framework for the probabilistic description of “noncommuta-
tive information.” This noncommutative nature of information in quantum
mechanics is what causes the essential difference between quantum mechanics
and classical mechanics.
We can view (i)-(iv) as the abstract axioms for a probabilistic descrip-
tion of information. We can define an observer’s information as being (the
probabilities given by) the state on the observable algebra, along with a
rule describing how these probabilities change when new data is received,
namely the (noncommutative) conditional probability (iii). The information
is called noncommutative in the case of the general noncommutative condi-
tional probability. If we were to add to axioms (i)-(iv) the assumption that
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the observable algebra is commutative, then we get an abstract formulation
of classical probability theory with the usual conditional probability, in which
case the information can be called commutative. The algebras B∞(F ) and
L(H) are nothing more than convenient representations (of the commutative
and noncommutative cases respectively), suitable for doing physics.
3. THE MEASURING PROCESS
Interpreting quantum mechanics as a probabilistic description of noncom-
mutative information, implies that an (ideal) measurement changes an ob-
server’s information, rather than disturbing the system as is often argued (for
example in Ref. 15, p. 46). This renders many problems surrounding the
measuring process in quantum mechanics no more difficult than in classical
mechanics. The answer to both question at the beginning of this paper is
simply that the observer’s information changed (i.e., the observer received
new data), exactly as for the corresponding classical questions. (In particular
this means that consciousness has no role to play in the measuring process.
The observer could be a computer connected to a measuring instrument, or
the measuring instrument itself, as long as it can obtain information about
the system.) We give a few more examples:
(a) The Heisenberg cut. This refers to an imaginary dividing line between
the observer and the system being observed (see for example Ref. 16, pp.
419-421 and 439-445, and Ref. 14, p. 295). It can be seen as the place
where information crosses from the system to the observer, but it leads to
the question of where exactly it should be; where does the observer begin?
In practice it’s not really a problem: It doesn’t matter where the cut is.
It is merely a philosophical question which is already present in classical
mechanics, since in the classical case information also passes from the system
to the observer and one could again ask where the observer begins. The
Heisenberg cut is therefore no more problematic in quantum mechanics than
in classical mechanics.
(b) When does the collapse of the wave function take place and how
long does it take? This is essentially the Heisenberg cut with space replaced
by time. One can pose the question as follows: When does an observer
“absorb” the data (i.e., when does the measurement take place, or when
does the observer’s information change), and how long does it take? Again
the quantum case is no different from the classical case, and moreover, in
practice it is no more of a problem than in the classical case.
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(c) Continuous observation (see Refs. 17 and 18 for example). The ideal
measurement discussed in Section 2 refers to a single measurement made at
some point in time. It can therefore not be applied directly to continuous
observation, i.e. when the observer’s information is continually changing.
However, in classical mechanics this is not considered a conceptual problem,
since one could in principle describe such a situation as a continual change in
the probability distribution (probability measure) describing the information,
even though it might be a difficult technical problem in practice. The same
is true in quantum mechanics, with the probability distribution replaced by
a state representing noncommutative information. (In quantum mechanics
however, the idea of continuous observation is probably an idealization, for
example watching something without blinking your eyes is not a continuous
measurement, since the photons registered by your retina are discrete.)
The “paradox of the watched pot that never boils” (called Zeno’s para-
dox by Misra and Sudarshan(19)) is resolved by noting that if an observer
continuously measures a certain observable, then the system can still evolve
in time to produce other values for the observable if the measurement is not
precise (as is typically the case). Say the observer measures an observable
A which has a discrete spectrum, and he can only determine its value up
to some interval containing (at a point in time) a number of eigenvalues of
the observable, say a1, ..., an. Then the state vector is projected onto the
subspace spanned by the eigenstates (at that point in time) corresponding
to a1, ..., an, in other words, onto the subspace which at that point in time
corresponds to the interval (keep in mind that time-evolution acts on the
observable algebra, and hence on the eigenstates of the observable). This
happens according to postulate (iii); see for example Ref. 20, pp. 260-266.
To clarify our argument, we assume here that before the continuous mea-
surement starts, the observer has maximal information, i.e. his information
is a state vector [the general case does not differ significantly, since it is still
handled with the same projection postulate (iii)]. Note that the state is now
still a state vector, and not a mixture of the eigenstates corresponding to
a1, ..., an. The interval which is measured (and hence the eigenvalues of A
contained in it) can change in the course of time (for example it can drift up
and down the real line), simply because of the lack of precision in the contin-
uous measurement. Therefore the value of A can change within this drifting
interval, in turn allowing the drifting interval’s average location to change
accordingly, which is what the observer sees. In the mathematics this looks
as follows: The continuous measurement confines the state vector via the
projection postulate to the “drifting” subspace corresponding to the drifting
interval. The observable’s eigenstates are evolving in time, but since this
drifting subspace contains many eigenstates of the observable at any point in
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time, the projection postulate does not cause the state vector to be “dragged
along” by one of the time-evolving eigenstates. Also, since the interval is
drifting, eigenstates are moving in and out of the subspace. Therefore the
state vector can be projected onto subspaces containing new eigenstates (cor-
responding to new eigenvalues), with eigenstates brought closer to the state
vector by time-evolution having higher probability. (This argument becomes
somewhat clearer in the Schro¨dinger picture, where the eigenstates are fixed,
but the subspace is still drifting.)
If the continuous measurement is precise enough, then quantum mechan-
ics indeed predict that “a watched pot never boils” if the observable’s eigen-
values are discrete (precise measurement of a continuous observable is im-
possible in practice). This happens because a quantum measurement can
invalidate previous information (i.e. the state vector can change by projec-
tion) which then “cancels out” the changes due to time-evolution acting on
the observable algebra (and thus on the observable’s eigenvectors onto which
projection of the state vector occurs). In effect the state vector is dragged
along by the time-evolving eigenstate corresponding to the measured value.
In classical mechanics on the other hand, previous information is not inval-
idated by measurement, hence the pure state of a system will not change
because of continuous observation, and therefore the values of observables
can change as time-evolution acts on the observable algebra. Note that this
is true even if the classical observable being observed is discrete (for example
“number of particles in the left half of the container”). So no matter how
closely we watch a classical pot, it can still boil.
(d) The EPR “paradox.” Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen(21) described a
now famous experiment in which two particles are created together (or in-
teract) and then move away from each other (which ends any interaction
between them) before a measurement is performed on one of the particles.
This measurement then gives corresponding data about the other particle
as well. [This is the result of an entanglement of the two particles’ states
(for example due to a conservation law), which can occur since the state
space is the tensor product of the two particles’ state spaces.] EPR argued
that this means that the second particle simultaneously has values for two
noncommuting observables like position and momentum, since only the first
particle is measured (either its position or its momentum is measured, but
not both), and hence quantum mechanics must be incomplete, since it says
that a particle does not simultaneously have values for position and momen-
tum. They based this on the idea that a measurement on the first particle
does not disturb the second. However, we have viewed a measurement as
the reception of data by the observer; it has nothing to do with the observer
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“directly” observing (and disturbing) the system. Measuring the first parti-
cle gives the observer data regarding the second particle as well (and hence
is a measurement of the second particle), which is mathematically described
by the second particle’s state vector (representing the observer’s noncom-
mutative information about this particle) now being in an eigenspace of the
observable which was measured. This is no different from the analogous sit-
uation in classical mechanics where for example conservation of momentum
can give the second particle’s momentum when the first particle’s momentum
is measured, except that in this case information is commutative.
We can even have two observers A and B measuring the same observable
of the two particles respectively. A’s measurement is then also a measurement
of the value B will get (A receives data about what B’s result will be) and so
there’s nothing strange in them getting correlated results (say opposite values
for momentum). No signal need travel faster than the speed of light to B’s
particle to “tell” it to have the opposite value to A’s result, in the same way
that no such signal is needed in the classical case. From A’s point of view, B
is part of the system along with the two particles, and so this experiment is
really no different from the original one observer EPR experiment above. The
particles along with B are in a superposition of states from A’s point of view
until A measures his particle, which reduces (by projection) the state vector
of the combined system of particles and B, with B then in the eigenspace “B
gets the opposite value.”
(e) System and observer as a combined system (see Ref. 22, pp. 175-183,
for a short and clear discussion). Here the time-evolution of the combined
system is supposed to account for the projection postulate of quantum me-
chanics. This is not possible in a natural way, since time-evolution is the
result of a one-parameter ∗-automorphism group. In classical mechanics the
combined system evolves according to classical dynamics (the observer being
thought of as a classical system in this case), and this then similarly would
have to account for the change in the observer’s information via a conditional
probability due to a measurement he performs on the system. Again this is
not possible in a natural way, since here too we have the same projection
postulate, namely the conditional probability (1), acting on the state (of the
system without observer), while the time-evolution acts as a one-parameter
∗-automorphism group on the observable algebra. The solution is that the
state of the combined system has to contain from the start the fact that the
observer will perform a measurement on the system at a given point in time
and will subsequently experience a change of information (this change is a
physical process in the observer, described by the combined system’s time-
evolution, for example some neural activity in a human observer’s brain),
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otherwise such a measurement and the change of information would not take
place. This is clear, since time-evolution does not act on the state, but on
the observable algebra, hence the state of the combined system is the state
“for all time” and does not change when the observer performs a measure-
ment. Exactly the same is true for quantum mechanics (where the observer is
then also viewed as a quantum system). The (noncommutative) conditional
probability, that is to say the projection postulate, is only relevant when the
observer is not considered to be part of the system, in which case the con-
ditional probability says what the change in the observer’s information will
be, it does not describe the physical process taking place in the observer to
accommodate (or store) the new information.
The point we attempt to make with these examples is that, even though
there might be certain problems surrounding the measuring process, quantum
mechanics does not introduce any conceptual problems not already present in
classical mechanics, as long as we assume that information is noncommutative
in quantum mechanics.
In connection with the two-slit experiment we can mention the following:
Assume that the probability density function for the position of detection of
a particle on the screen in the two-slit experiment is given by an interfer-
ence pattern when no measurement is performed at the two open slits. This
density function represents the observer’s information about where on the
screen the particle will be detected. In the light of our discussion thus far,
it should then not be too surprising that this density function (i.e. the ob-
server’s information) can be invalidated via the noncommutative conditional
probability (1), if the observer does measure through which slit the particle
goes (i.e. if the observer receives new data), giving a completely different
probability density function at the screen, for example points that had zero
probability density now having positive probability density, as mentioned in
the Introduction. This is unlike the classical case where a measurement at the
slits gives the observer more information, rather than invalidating previous
information. (Also see Ref. 2.)
We can also consider the case of more than one observer touched upon
in (d). Say three observers A, B and C are observing the same system,
but B and C are not aware of each other or of A. B and C measure two
noncommuting observables P and Q respectively, in the order P , Q, P , and
A in turn measures B and C’s results in this order ( he “sees” each of their
results at the time they obtain them). We ignore the time-evolution of the
system. Say the results are p1, q, p2 (in this order), then clearly p1 and p2 need
not be the same since P and Q do not commute. So from B’s point of view it
seems that something disturbed the system between his two measurements of
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P . However, in our interpretation it is actually B’s information that has been
invalidated by A and C’s measurement of Q. This is not too strange, since
B and C are merely A’s measuring instruments. One could ask what would
happen if A wasn’t there. Would B then get p1 = p2 with probability one? In
the absence of A, does it even make sense to talk of the time order P , Q, P
if B and C are not aware of each other? In our interpretation time ordering
should probably be viewed as in some way defined by events where data is
received by an observer, and in this case it seems possible that B would get
p1 = p2 with probability one in the absence of A and no other way to define
the time ordering. (Note that in the two-slit experiment for example, there
is a time ordering in the sense that a measurement on a particle at the slits is
performed before a measurement on the same particle at the screen, even if
the measurements are performed by two different observers not aware of each
other, so the interference pattern at the screen can still be destroyed in this
setup.) The idea of defining time ordering in terms of a series of events (an
event in our case being the reception of data by an observer, or alternatively,
a change in an observer’s information) was introduced by Finkelstein.(23)
4. DISCUSSION
We have now seen that the general structure of quantum mechanics is actually
a mathematical framework for handling noncommutative information, rather
than being a physical theory in itself.
If we assume that information in our physical world is described by quan-
tum mechanics, this leads us to conclude that information is actually a non-
commutative phenomenon. Perhaps this means that since information “lives”
in spacetime (and possibly in some way defines spacetime structure as was
alluded to at the end of Section 3), spacetime itself is noncommutative, as has
been suggested in attempts to construct quantum spacetime and quantum
gravity; see for example Ref. 24. On the other extreme, the term “non-
commutative information” may be a “purely grammatical trick” of the sort
Marsden,(25) p. 188, mused might “be the ultimate solution of the quan-
tum measurement problem”; this possibility seems somewhat less interesting
however.
It also explains the linearity of quantum mechanics. The general struc-
ture of classical mechanics in Section 2 is linear, since it is nothing more
than probability theory, even though it can be applied to physical systems
where nonlinear aspects might be involved. It is the statistical point of view
that makes everything linear (this boils down to the use of averages, which
are integrals and hence linear). The same goes for quantum mechanics. Its
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linear structure should not be viewed as an approximation to an underlying
nonlinear world, but simply as a result of the fact that it is a mathemat-
ical framework for probability theory (i.e. statistics, averages), where the
information involved happens to be noncommutative. The appearance of a
Hilbert space as the state space is simply a mathematical way of represent-
ing the noncommutative ∗-algebraic general structure in Section 2. So the
linearity of (and hence superpositions in) the state space is just a convenient
way to express the fact that a measurement can invalidate the information
the observer had before the measurement, or more precisely, to express non-
commutative conditional probabilities. Also see Ref. 14, p. 309, and Ref. 26,
p. 175, for similar remarks concerning the linearity of quantum mechanics.
A review of quantum mechanics viewed as a generalization of classical
probability theory can be found in Ref. 27.
We cannot claim that this noncommutative information interpretation
solves all the conceptual problems of quantum physics, but for the general
situation of a quantum mechanical system being observed by an observer, it
does seem to clarify many issues without causing any new problems (except if
you consider the idea of noncommutative information itself to be a problem).
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